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1Abstract
We analyze the endogenous price formation mechanism of a pure exchange economy
with two assets, riskless and risky. The economy is populated by an arbitrarily large
number of traders whose investment choices are described by means of generic smooth
functions of past realizations. These choices can be consistent with (but not limited to)
the solutions of expected utility maximization problems.
Under the assumption that individual demand for the risky asset is expressed as a
fraction of individual wealth, we derive a complete characterization of equilibria. It is
shown that irrespectively of the number of agents and of their behavior, all possible
equilibria belong to a one-dimensional “Equilibrium Market Curve”. This geometric
tool helps to illustrate the possibility of diﬀerent phenomena, as multiple equilibria, and
can be used for comparative static analysis. We discuss the relative performances of
diﬀerent strategies and the selection principle governing market dynamics on the basis
of the stability analysis of equilibria.
JEL codes: G12, D83.
Keywords: Asset Pricing Model, Procedural Rationality, Heterogeneous Agents, CRRA
Framework, Equilibrium Market Curve, Stability Analysis, Multiple Equilibria.
21 Introduction
There exists a long-standing tradition in theoretical economics to model economic agents as
having a strictly limited range of notionally available actions. Maximization of a suitable
function (e.g. expected utility) is widely accepted as a reasonable description of individual
behavior, as it captures the idea of rationality and proﬁt seeking behind the actions of the
“economic man”. As early as ﬁfty years ago, however, some writers, most notably Herbert
Simon, recognized a strong dissonance between the modeling of human behavior in economics
and the description of the same behavior in other social sciences. Indeed Simon (1955) em-
phasizes that, due to informational and cognitive restrictions, people may not be acting as if
they were utility maximizers who are able to perfectly anticipate their own and others’ future
decisions and reactions. At the same time, however, it is in general true that human beings
avoid behaving in a random manner. Rather they tend to follow some deliberate procedures in
their decision making process. This broader view on economic behavior led to the concept of
procedural rationality (Simon, 1976) which still includes, as a special case, the optimizing and
perfectly anticipating behavior but which can, at the same time, account for diﬀerent types
of learning.
The assumption of procedurally rational agents implies that the level of heterogeneity in
the market is much larger than it is usually assumed. As argued by Kirman (2006) this
heterogeneity is probably fundamental for the functioning of market economies. Notice that,
in principle, even “substantive rational” agents imbued with perfectly anticipating rationality
may diﬀer in terms of their preference structure and, hence, in their implied actions. At the
same time, heterogeneity in expectations is reported in several surveys on traders behavior
and is the basis for several proposed explanations for the abnormal large trading volume in
ﬁnancial markets and for other observed “anomalies” (e.g. Brock (1997); Hommes (2006) and
references therein). Such “rational heterogeneity” is broaden and strengthen by the various
violations of axioms of rational choice which have been well documented by a number of
diﬀerent studies in the ﬁeld of experimental economics1.
1The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Kagel and Roth, 1995) and the Nobel lecture of Daniel
3If the evidence supports the idea of procedural rationality of heterogeneous agents, why
do the models based on that assumption remain exceptions rather than norm? In his review
of the literature on bounded rationality, Conlisk (1996) identiﬁes a number of possible reasons
for the dominance of substantive rational behavior in economic modeling. One of them is that
such behavior, even if not entirely realistic, seriously restricts the range of possible actions,
and, hence, brings discipline into the theory. By acknowledging the need of discipline, this
paper seeks to dispel the fear of getting lost in the “wilderness of bounded rationality”. In the
context of a simple speculative asset market our model demonstrates that (i) market forces
and (ii) a natural requirement for consistency between aggregate dynamics and individual
actions will lead to quite speciﬁc conclusions about the long-run state of the market.
We consider a dynamic model where an arbitrary number of heterogeneous agents trade
a riskless bond and a long-lived risky asset. The only restriction imposed on the individual
behavior is that the amount of asset demanded by traders is expressed as a fraction of their
current wealth. In technical terms, this assumption conﬁnes possible agents’ behavior to the
so-called constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) framework. The shares of personal wealth
invested in the risky security are chosen, at each period, following individual procedures and
on the basis of commonly available information. We model procedural rationality by means of
agent-speciﬁc investment functions which map the information set to the present investment
share. The dynamics of the multi-dimensional system describing the evolution of asset price
and agents’ wealth is derived. Without imposing any constraint about the speciﬁc form of the
investment functions we are able to completely characterize those equilibria in which aggregate
market dynamics is consistent with agents expectations. Equilibrium price return and wealth
distribution turn out to be a combined outcome of the agents’ adaptive procedures and of
the evolutionary selection taking place in the market. Speciﬁcally, we show that two types
of long-run dynamics are possible. In the ﬁrst type both securities give the same expected
return, and the wealth of all agents grows at the same rate. In the second type one of the
Kahneman (Kahneman, 2003) provides plenty of examples of systematic biases, i.e. individual decisions which
would be qualiﬁed as irrational from the traditional economic point of view.
4securities gives a higher expected return, and one or few “survivors” ultimately possess the
total wealth of the economy. We derive the local stability results for all possible steady-states.
The conditions are ready to be applied for any speciﬁc ecology of traders whose behavior can
be accommodated in our framework.
Two distinct streams of theoretical research intersect in our paper. The main source of
our inspiration is the growing ﬁeld of the Heterogeneous Agent Models (HAMs), extensively
reviewed in Hommes (2006). The HAM literature considers markets as a feedback system,
where agents employ adaptive expectation rules, so that current prices aﬀect expectations
about future prices, and, consequently, prices themselves. Modeling stylized behaviors of
“fundamentalists” or “trend chasers”, the HAMs can explain diﬀerent “stylized facts” of ﬁ-
nancial markets, such as excess volatility and repeated patterns of temporary bubbles followed
by severe crashes. In our opinion, however, this approach lacks an unifying framework, be-
cause expectation rules vary from model to model. By keeping investment functions generic we
intend to create such a framework, avoiding, at the same time, an unrealistic level of simplic-
ity in the agents’ expectational procedures and considering truly heterogeneous preferences.
Furthermore, in the HAMs with evolving population (as e.g. in Brock and Hommes (1998)),
agents switch between diﬀerent forecasting rules on the basis of some performance measure,
which is often introduced ad hoc. Conversely, the wealth dynamics, explicitly considered in
our framework, provide a natural performance measure.2
Multi-asset markets populated by several procedurally rational agents are studied in the
literature on Evolutionary Finance (EF), initiated by Blume and Easley (1992), and recently
2Our paper can be considered as only a ﬁrst step towards an unifying framework of the HAM literature.
An issue is that many HAMs are built in the so-called constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) framework,
which is outside of the scope of this paper. In the CARA framework agents’ demand is independent of their
wealth, and thus wealth dynamics do not aﬀect asset pricing. Our framework is, instead, of constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA), where the agents’ investment shares do not depend on their wealth, so that demand for
the risky asset increases linearly with wealth. The inclusion of CARA strategies in a CRRA-based framework
is a subject of future research. Notice, however, that experiments with human subjects usually reject CARA
behavior, supporting decreasing or constant relative risk aversion, see for example Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport
(1988) and the discussion of this issue in Levy, Levy, and Solomon (2000).
5reviewed in Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2009). Our paper shares a number of dis-
tinctive features with the EF literature, such as a descriptive approach to the investment
behavior of agents and the central role played by the wealth-driven selection in determining
the long-run dynamics of the market. The EF literature focuses on the relative valuation of
diﬀerent risky assets. It is also speciﬁcally interested in a search for those strategies which
attract most wealth and are evolutionary stable, i.e., are not driven out by alternative behav-
iors. In contrast to the EF literature, but in the spirit of the HAMs, in this paper we focus on
the nature of market instabilities caused by the adaptive behavior of agents and the feedback
mechanism existing between realized and expected market conditions. This diﬀerence in focus
is reﬂected in our investment functions, which explicitly depend on past realized returns3
These distinct streams of economic research, the EF and HAMs, meet in the main result of
this paper, the local stability conditions of procedurally consistent equilibria in which aggregate
market dynamics is consistent with agents expectations. We ﬁnd that two conditions are
necessary and suﬃcient for the stability of one or many-survivors equilibria. The ﬁrst is
essentially the requirement of evolutionary stability of the surviving strategies, which is similar
to the “survival” criteria adopted in EF models. The second is the dynamic stability of these
strategies under the price feedback mechanism, a typical result of the HAMs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, pre-
senting and brieﬂy discussing our assumptions. First, we explicitly write the traders’ inter-
temporal budget constraints. Second, we derive the resulting dynamics in terms of returns and
wealth shares. Third, we introduce agent speciﬁc investment functions. Finally, we introduce
the notion of Procedurally Consistent Equilibrium that will be used as a formal deﬁnition
3There are other details which distinguish our approach from the EF literature. Namely: a risk-free asset
is available in our economy at a given price, we have only one risky asset and we do not let agents consume
all the dividend payoﬀs. In addition, the earlier EF papers by Hens and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2005) and Amir,
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2005) model assets as short-lived and, consequently, ignore capital
gain as a component of agents’ wealth accumulation. The last models of the EF literature (see, e.g., Amir,
Evstigneev, and Xu (2008), Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2006, 2008)) all deal with long-lived assets,
as we do in our framework.
6of equilibrium throughout the paper. In Section 3 we present the equilibrium and stability
analysis of the system in the simplest case of a single active trader. The geometric locus
of all possible equilibria, the Equilibrium Market Curve, is derived, and its use is discussed.
Then we derive general stability conditions and we discuss few important special cases which
received particular attention from the past literature. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of
the general case in which an arbitrarily large number of traders are present in the market.
The implications of our ﬁndings concerning the general ability of market forces in selecting
the “best” strategy are discussed in Section 4.4 while Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Deﬁnition
Consider a simple pure exchange economy where trading activities take place in discrete time.
The economy is composed by a riskless asset (bond) giving in each period a constant interest
rate rf > 0 and a risky asset (equity) paying a random dividend Dt at the beginning of each
period t. The riskless asset is considered the num´ eraire of economy and its price is ﬁxed to 1.
The ex-dividend price Pt of the risky asset is determined at each period, on the basis of the
aggregate demand, through market-clearing condition. The resulting intertemporal budget
constraint is derived below and the main hypotheses, on the nature of the investment choices
and of the fundamental process, are discussed. These hypotheses will allow us to derive the
explicit dynamical system governing the evolution of the economy.
2.1 Intertemporal budget constraint
We consider general situation when the economy is populated by a ﬁxed number N of traders4.
Let Wt,n and xt,n stand for the wealth of trader n at time t and for the fraction of his
wealth invested into the risky asset. Following Epstein and Zin (1989) and similarly to Amir,
4Using the terminology of the heterogeneous agent literature, we consider N types of traders (cf. Brock,
Hommes, and Wagener (2005)). Notice, however, that all traders possessing the same investment behavior
(type) are considered as one single investor. That is, in the terminology of the evolutionary ﬁnance literature
we deal with N diﬀerent strategies (cf. Hens and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2005))
7Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2005) we assume that total agent’s wealth is rein-
vested and ignore consumption. Thus, after the trading session at time t, agent n possesses
xt,n Wt,n/Pt shares of the risky asset and (1 − xt,n)Wt,n shares of the riskless security. In the
beginning of time t+1 the agent gets (in terms of the num´ eraire) random dividends Dt+1 per
each share of the risky asset and constant interest rate rf for all shares of the riskless asset.
Therefore, at time t + 1 the wealth of agent n is given by
Wt+1,n(Pt+1) = (1 − xt,n)Wt,n (1 + rf) +
xt,n Wt,n
Pt
(Pt+1 + Dt+1) . (1)
Through the capital gain the new wealth depends on the price Pt+1 of the risky asset, which
is ﬁxed so that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. Assuming a constant supply of
the risky asset, whose quantity can then be normalized to 1, the price Pt+1 is deﬁned as the
solution of the equation
N X
n=1
xt+1,n Wt+1,n(Pt+1) = Pt+1 . (2)
Simultaneous solution of (1) and (2) provides the new price Pt+1. Once the price is ﬁxed, the
new portfolios and wealths are determined and economy is ready for the next round.
The dynamics deﬁned by (1) and (2) describe an exogenously growing economy due to
the continuous injections of new shares of the riskless asset, whose price remains, under the
assumption of totally elastic supply, unchanged. In order to simplify the following analysis, it
is convenient to remove this exogenous economic expansion from the dynamics of the model.
To this purpose we introduce rescaled variables
wt,n = Wt,n/(1 + rf)
t , pt = Pt/(1 + rf)
t , et = Dt/(Pt−1 (1 + rf)) , (3)
denoted with lower case names. The quantity et represents (to within a factor) the dividend
yield. Using new variables, (1) and (2) read
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∀n ∈ {1,...,N} .
(4)
8These equations represent an evolution of state variables wt,n and pt over time, provided that
stochastic process {et} is given and the set of investment shares {xt,n} is speciﬁed.5
In this paper the agents’ investment shares are assumed to be independent of the contempo-
raneous price and wealth, the assumption which will be formalized in Section 2.3. System (4)
implies a simultaneous determination of the equilibrium price pt+1 and of the agents’ wealths
wt+1,n, so that the state of the system at time t + 1 is only implicitly deﬁned. For analytical
purposes, one has to derive the explicit equations that govern the system dynamics.
2.2 The dynamical system for wealth shares and price return


















The transformation of the implicit dynamics (4) into an explicit one is not, in general, possible
also because the market price should remain positive over time. On the other hand, the agents
are allowed to have negative wealth, which is interpreted as debt in that case. Therefore, ϕt,n
are arbitrary numbers whose sum over all agents is equal to 1 for any period t.
The next result gives the condition for which the dynamical system implicitly deﬁned in
(4) can be made explicit without violating the requirement of positiveness of prices.
Proposition 2.1. Let us assume that initial price p0 is positive. From equations (4) it is
possible to derive a map RN → RN that describes the evolution of traders’ wealth wt,n with
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5Notice that (4) is equivalent to (1) and (2) and can be simply obtained setting rf = 0.





∀n ∈ {1,...,N} , (8)
and agents’ (rescaled) wealth shares ϕt,n evolve according to
ϕt+1,n = ϕt,n
1 + (rt+1 + et+1)xt,n





∀n ∈ {1,...,N} . (9)
Proof. See appendix A.
The market evolution is explicitly described by the system of N + 1 equations in (7) and
(8), or, equivalently, in (7) and (9). The dynamics of rescaled price pt can be derived from (7)
in a trivial way, but price will remain positive only if condition (6) is satisﬁed6. Finally, using
(4), one can easily obtain the evolution of unscaled price Pt.
In (7), analogously to the evolutionary ﬁnance literature discussed in the Introduction,
agents who have relatively more wealth have a higher impact on the determination of price.
Since we consider an inﬁnitely lived asset, the investment decision at time t aﬀects also the
determination of price (and return) at time t + 1. The wealth dynamics in (8) reveal that
individual returns are proportional to the gross return (capital gain or loss plus the dividend
yield). Finally, (9) describes the evolution of the relative wealth. As long as higher wealth
gains can be considered associated to a higher ‘ﬁtness”, one can interpret this relation as
a replicator dynamics (Weibull, 1995), in which the market inﬂuence of each agent changes
according to his performance relative to the average performance.
Following Chiarella and He (2001) and Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006) we make
the following7
Assumption 1. The dividend yields et are i.i.d. random variables obtained from a common
distribution with positive support.
6In general, it may be quite diﬃcult to check the validity of this condition at each time step. However, if
agents are diversifying their portfolio and do not go short, so that 0 < xt,n < 1 ∀t,n, then inequality (6) is
always satisﬁed (Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto, 2006).
7For diﬀerent speciﬁcations of dividend process inside the same framework see Chiarella, Dieci, and Gardini
(2006) and Anufriev and Dindo (2009).
10This assumption implies that price and dividends grow at the same rate, as, for instance,
fundamental price does in an economy with geometrically growing dividends.8 Notice however
that in our model the price is determined through the market clearing condition and is not
necessary ﬁxed on the fundamental level. On the empirical side, a simple inspection of the
annual historical data for the Standard&Poor’s 500 index suggest that yield can be reasonably
described as a bounded positive random variable with roughly stationary behavior.9
2.3 Agents’ investment functions
We consider a general framework in which every agent decides independently the share of
wealth he wants to invest in the risky security. The agent’s decision variable is not the
amount of shares of the risky asset in the portfolio, but the wealth share invested in the asset,
which should be independent of the contemporaneous price and wealth levels. This restriction,
which can be referred as a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) framework, implies that the
dynamics derived in Proposition 2.1 are well-deﬁned.
Since in this paper we are mainly concerned with the eﬀect of speculative behaviors on the
market aggregate performance, we let aside those issues which may occur under asymmetric
knowledge of the underlying fundamental process. Thus, we assume that the structure of
the yield process deﬁned in Assumption 1 is known to everybody. Consequently, we assume
that all agents base their investment decisions at time t exclusively on the public and com-
monly available information set It−1 formed by past realized prices. This set can alternatively
be deﬁned through the past return realizations as It−1 = {rt−1,rt−2,...} and we make the
following
Assumption 2. For each agent n there exists a smooth investment function fn which maps
the present information set into his or her investment decision
xt,n = fn(It−1). (10)
8Inside an economy with inﬁnitely lived assets, Assumption 1 is equivalent to the i.i.d. payoﬀ structure
considered in Blume and Easley (1992).
9See for instance the graph at p.8 of Schiller (2000) and the discussion therein.
11The function fn gives a complete description of the investment decision of the n-th agent
who adapts to observed price ﬂuctuations. The knowledge about the yield process is not
explicitly inserted in the information set but can be considered embedded in the functional
form of fn.
Assumption 2 is strictly related to the “smooth” learning hypothesis described in Grand-
mont (1998). It is compatible with a number of diﬀerent learning processes based on common
information, as for instance the Bayesian learning, or, more generally, the adaptive models
explored inside the EF literature (Blume and Easley, 1992; Hens and Schenk-Hopp´ e, 2005).
Indeed, the investment choice in (10) can be thought as the result of two separate steps. In
the ﬁrst step agent n, using a set of estimators or “expectation functions” (Grandmont, 1998)
{gn,1,gn,2,...}, forms his prediction about the behavior of future prices, θn,j = gn,j(It−1),
where θ.,j stands for some statistics of the returns distribution at time t + 1, e.g. the average
return, the expected variance or the probability that a given return threshold will be crossed.
Then, using a choice function hn deﬁned in terms of these expectations, the agent computes
the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset xt+1,n = hn(θn,1,θn,2,...). As a result, the
investment function fn becomes a composition of a set of estimators {gn,·} and an individual
choice function hn. The choice function can be derived from some optimization procedure (as
the maximization of expected utility under uncertainty) or, more generally, can reﬂect a sat-
isfying behavior. The expectation functions g’s can account for the outcomes of fundamental
and technical valuation, widely used both in trading practices observed in real markets and in
the HAMs. The present framework is indeed able to account for a wide spectrum of behavioral
assumptions. An example is provided in Appendix B where we brieﬂy discuss how a myopic
utility maximization framework, widely adopted by the HAM literature, can be treated in
terms of expectation and choice functions. Another example is the model we developed in
Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006) (the predecessor of this paper), in which adaptive
agents decide their investment shares on the basis of exponentially weighted moving averages
of past returns and their variance. Our Assumption 2 generalizes such behaviour by allow-
ing agents to map the past return history into the future investment choice, using whatever
12smooth function they like. Using the terminology coined by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1976),
in this paper we consider generic procedurally rational traders whose investment functions are
the collective description of preferences, beliefs and implied actions.
Under Assumption 1, the dynamics in terms of price return, wealth shares and investment
shares are described by (7), (9) and (10). In order to analyze a ﬁnite-dimensional system
we restrict each agent n to base his decision on the past Ln price returns. Without loss of
generality we can assume that the “memory span” is the same for all traders and denote it by
L. For the following discussion L must be ﬁnite, but can be arbitrarily large.
2.4 Procedurally Consistent Equilibria
The “rational expectations” approach (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1978) postulating that the dynam-
ics generated by the actions of an agent should be consistent with his a priori expectations
about the dynamics itself, is too restrictive for a framework with heterogeneous, procedurally
rational agents. A suitable concept for such framework would be an “adaptive procedural
rationality” under which agents’ actions generate dynamics which are in turn consistent with
these co-evolving actions. In this paper we focus on the emergence of equilibria of this kind,
deﬁned as situations in which agents are have no incentive to review their choices. In the
setup outlined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 the agents choose the wealth share x to invest in the
risky asset. Consequently we apply the following
Deﬁnition 2.1. Procedurally Consistent Equilibria (PCE) are the trajectories of the system
deﬁned by (7) and (8) (or, equivalently, by (7) and (9)) with ﬁxed investment shares xt,n = x∗
n
and stationary wealth distribution ϕt,n = ϕ∗
n for all n and t.
At the PCE agents are not changing their actions, and, at the same time, the aggregate
dynamics is consistent with the procedures agents use to decide their positions in the market.
While the consistency requirement seems intuitive, the assumption of constant actions requires
some justiﬁcation. It is, for instance, at odds with complex dynamics emerging in many
HAMs, e.g. Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992) or Brock and Hommes (1998), where one
13observes cyclic or even chaotic motion of individual agents’ wealth and portfolios. Indeed,
our interest lies not in the global dynamics of a market with a few agents having stylized
behaviors, but in the investigation, under general assumptions, of the local properties of the
feasible PCE. Moreover, the situation in which an agent changes his position each period in
a chaotic manner does not only seems unrealistic, but, in our opinion, can hardly play a role
in the generalization of the notion of equilibrium for multi-agent setting. For instance, if a
forecasting agent observes persistent mistakes (periodic or quasi-periodic) in his prediction
of future market dynamics, he will probably adopt new forecasting procedures. The new
procedures would make his investment decision diﬀerent and, ultimately, perturb the system
away from the previous trajectory. As long as a minimal evolutionary pressure is put on the
system, so that agents can revise their strategies if they led to incorrect expectations, any
equilibrium whose dynamics is not consistent with the actions of agents is likely to have a
transitory nature.
In what follows any use of the term “equilibrium” refers to the speciﬁc notion of equilibrium
introduced by Deﬁnition 2.1.
3 Single Agent Case
We start with the analysis of the very special situation in which a single agent operates in the
market. The main reason to perform this analysis rests in its relevance for the multi-agent
case, as we will see in the next Section. In particular, some type of the generic equilibrium
in the setting with N heterogeneous traders requires, as necessary condition for stability, the
stability of a suitably deﬁned single agent equilibrium.
This Section starts laying down the dynamics of the single agent economy as a multidimen-
sional dynamical system of diﬀerence equations of the ﬁrst order. All possible steady-states
of the system are identiﬁed and their stability studied using the associated characteristic
polynomial.
143.1 Dynamical system
In the case of one single agent the evolution of wealth shares in (8) is trivial and can be ignored.
As a consequence, the whole system can be described with only L + 1 variables representing
the present investment choice and the L past returns. We denote the price return at time t−l
as rt,l, so that the system reads
8
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rt+1,L−1 = rt,L−2 .
(11)
The function R in the right hand-side of (7) is deﬁned as
R(x
0,x,e) =
x0 − x + ex0 x
(1 − x0)x
, (12)
where x,x0 and e denote the previous period investment choice, the current (contemporaneous
with return) investment choice and the dividend yield, respectively.
The system (11) depends on the noise component et which, according to Assumption 1, is
an i.i.d. random variable. In the following analysis we substitute the yield realizations {et}
by their mean value ¯ e considering the deterministic skeleton of (11). The resulting system
describes, in a sense, the “average” of the stochastic dynamics.10 Once referred to the deter-
ministic skeleton, the set of Procedurally Consistent Equilibria introduced in Deﬁnition 2.1
reduces to a set of ﬁxed points of (11). Indeed, from (12), if the investment choice x is
not changing over time, then x = x0, and price returns are also constant. The next section
investigates whether it is possible to characterize all the ﬁxed points of (11).
10This substitution is in general dangerous, as small random shocks could accumulate along a trajectory so
that their ﬁnal eﬀect on the system dynamics becomes huge. This is however not the case when one considers
asymptotically stable ﬁxed points, as we will do later. In this case, as long as random shocks are suﬃciently
small, the dynamics of the stochastic system is bounded in a neighborhood of the ﬁxed point of the associated
deterministic skeleton.
153.2 Equilibrium market curve
It turns out that independently of agent’s behavior, all possible equilibria belong to a one-
dimensional curve, the Equilibrium Market Curve. The next deﬁnition introduces the locus of
equilibria, while the following proposition, which characterizes the equilibria of (11), clarify
its role.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The Equilibrium Market Curve (EMC) is the function l(r) deﬁned as
l(r) =
r
¯ e + r
. (13)
Let x∗ denote the agent’s wealth share invested in the risky asset at equilibrium and let r∗
be the equilibrium return (equal to the returns for all lags). One has the following
Proposition 3.1. Let x¤ = (x∗;r∗,...,r∗) be a ﬁxed point of the deterministic skeleton of
(11). Then








(ii) at the ﬁxed point x¤ prices are positive if either x∗ < 1 or x∗ ≥ 1/(1 − ¯ e).
(iii) in x¤ the growth rate of agent’s wealth is equal to the price return r∗.
Proof. See appendix C.
The ﬁrst statement in the previous Proposition justiﬁes the introduction of the Equilibrium
Market Curve in Deﬁnition 3.1. Indeed, according to (14) all ﬁxed points of the dynamics can
be found as the intersections of the EMC with the symmetrization of function f, i.e. with the
restriction of this function to the one-dimensional subspace deﬁned as r0 = r1 = ··· = rL−1.
The main reason for such a simple characterization of equilibria is the underlying requirement
of consistency between self-fulﬁlling agent’s choice and the resulting dynamics. The EMC is
the locus of points where agents’ expectation formation mechanism is compatible with the
intertemporal relation governing market dynamics.
16-e - 0






































Figure 1: Left panel: Investment function based on the last two realized returns and its intersection
(thick line) with the symmetric plane. Equilibria are found on this plane as intersections with the
EMC. Right panel: Equilibria of system (11) are intersections of the EMC with symmetrizations
of the agents’ investment functions (shown as thick lines and labeled as I and II). There are two
equilibria in both cases: S1 and U1 in the market with agent I, and S2 and U2 in the market with
agent II.
Condition (14) is illustrated in Fig. 1. The left panel shows a two-dimensional investment
function which depends on the two last realized returns, f(rt−1,rt−2). Only the intersection
with the diagonal plane deﬁned by the equation rt−1 = rt−2 is relevant for the question
of equilibria location. This plane is represented in the left panel. The hyperbolic curve
shown as a thin line represents the EMC (13), while two thick curves depict two investment
functions. These curves are symmetrizations of the investment functions ,which in general
depend on several variables. The thick curves are the intersections of these multi-dimensional
functions with the hyper-plane r0 = ··· = rL−1. In turn, the intersections of the (symmetrized)
investment functions with the EMC are all possible equilibria of the system. The ordinate of
the intersection gives the value of equilibrium investment share x∗, while the abscissa gives
the equilibrium return r∗.
According to Proposition 3.1(ii), economically meaningful equilibria are characterized by
values of the investment share inside the intervals (−∞,1) or [1/(1 − ¯ e),+∞). It amounts to
require r∗ > −1, which implies that part of the EMC on the left from point E is meaningless.
17On the remaining part of the Curve one can distinguish between three qualitatively diﬀerent
scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario, when r∗ ∈ [−1,−¯ e), the return is negative and, hence, rescaled price
pt of the risky asset decreases to 0. The wealth of the agent is positive at any moment of time
and is eventually vanishing. The agent possesses the total supply of the risky asset, while his
own amount of the num´ eraire is negative. Thus, the agent has to borrow money in order to
keep his relatively high demand for the risky asset. Due to the decrease in the agent’s wealth,
this demand is insuﬃcient to generate high (not even positive) returns.
In the second scenario, when r∗ ∈ (−¯ e,0), the capital gain on the risky asset is negative
and the price of the asset decreases. However, the contribution from the dividend makes
the gross return r∗ + ¯ e positive. Furthermore, agent has to have negative wealth (has to be
indebted) and, at the same time, has to borrow money in order to keep the demand of the
asset positive.11 The agent possesses the total supply of the risky asset and a negative amount
of the num´ eraire. From Proposition 3.1(iii) it follows that the dividend payment allows the
agent’s wealth to increase to 0. Equilibrium S2 for agent II in the left panel of Fig. 1 is of
such kind.
Finally, in the third scenario, when the rescaled return is positive, the price pt of the asset
increases. Agent has a positive amount of the num´ eraire and his total wealth is positive and
increasing. Such a situation is observed in equilibria S1, U1 and U2.
What can be said about the dynamics of unscaled price Pt in all these three scenarios? To
answer this question it is important to bear in mind the following relation between the scaled
return rt and return Rt in terms of unscaled price:
1 + Rt = (1 + rt)(1 + rf) .
Therefore, in the third scenario, where the rescaled price increases, the unscaled price also
increases with a higher rate. Conversely, in the ﬁrst and second scenarios, even if the rescaled
11In general, to guarantee the positiveness of the price at the initial period one has to choose initial wealth
appropriately. Since p0 = x∗w0, for positive x∗ the initial (and consequent) agent’s wealth is positive, while
for negative x∗ the wealth is negative.
18price is decreasing, the unscaled price may increase due to high enough risk-free interest rate.
To conclude our discussion about equilibrium properties notice that in all possible equilibria
there exists a non-zero equity premium, i.e. a diﬀerence between the total return of the riskless
and the risky asset given by
Pt+1 − Pt + Dt+1
Pt
− rf =
¯ e(1 + rf)
1 − x∗ . (15)
The equity premium, which is empirically observed in real markets (Mehra and Prescott,
1985), can be explained, within the classical paradigm, as a monetary incentive required by an
optimizing risk-averse representative agent to hold the risky asset. In our framework, instead,
the risk premium is endogenously generated by the feedback eﬀect from market return to
agent’s wealth and the reinvestment of the latter. Consequently, the equity premium increases
with the dividend yield (1+rf)¯ e and with the propensity of agent to invest in the risky asset,
x∗.
3.3 Stability of single-agent equilibria
The stability conditions are derived from the analysis of the roots of the characteristic polyno-
mial associated with the Jacobian of system (11) computed at equilibrium. The characteristic
polynomial does, in general, depend on the behavior of the individual investment function f
in an inﬁnitesimal neighborhood of the equilibrium x¤. This dependence can be summarized
with the help of the following
















where all the derivatives are computed in (r∗,...,r∗).
Using the previous deﬁnition, the stability conditions can be formulated in terms of the





(¯ e + r∗)2 .
The following applies
19Proposition 3.2. The ﬁxed point x¤ = (x∗;r∗,...,r∗) of system (11) is (locally) asymptoti-











are inside the unit circle. The equilibrium x¤ is unstable if at least one of the roots of Q(µ)
lies outside the unit circle.
Proof. The condition above is a direct consequence of the characteristic polynomial of the
Jacobian matrix at equilibrium. See Appendix D for a derivation.
Once the investment function f is known, the polynomial Pf(µ) and, in turn, the polyno-
mial Q(µ) can be explicitly derived. The analysis of the L + 1 roots of Q(µ) (usually called
multipliers) reveals the role of the diﬀerent parameters in stabilizing a given equilibrium.
3.4 Examples of single-agent system
Since the explicit expression for the roots of (17) cannot, in general, be derived even for rel-
atively simple investment functions, the analytical study of the eﬀect of diﬀerent parameters
is often unfeasible and one has to rely on numerical investigations. Mainly for illustrative
purposes we present below three relatively simple cases where analytical results are, to some
extent, available. Inspired by models already discussed in the literature, we show how Propo-
sitions 3.1 and 3.2 can be applied to obtain rather general results about the eﬀect of diﬀerent
behavioral assumptions. The reader is referred to Appendix E for the derivation of results
and for further discussions.
Example 1. Agent with short memory, L = 1.
Consider an agent with a memory spanning a single lag, i.e. whose present investment share
depends only on the last realized return, xt+1 = f(rt). This is, for instance, the case of an
agent who simply predicts the next price return to be equal to the last realized return. In this
case, the stability polynomial is simply Pf = f0(r∗). Applying the general result obtained in
Propositions E.1 and E.2, one gets












r∗ > −1 . (18)
The ﬁxed point exhibits a Neimark-Sacker, fold or ﬂip bifurcation if the ﬁrst, second or third
inequality in (18) turns to equality, respectively.
The stability region S deﬁned by the three inequalities in (18) is shown as a dark area in
the upper left panel of Fig. 2 in coordinates r∗ and f0(r∗)/l0(r∗). The second coordinate is
the relative slope of the investment function at equilibrium with respect to the slope of the
Equilibrium Market Curve. The boundaries of the stability region are labeled as “Neimark-
Sacker”, “ﬂip” and “fold” depending on the type of bifurcation undertaken by the system when
a particular boundary is crossed (e.g. ”Neimark-Sacker” curve corresponds to those points
where two complex conjugated multipliers cross the unit circle). Notice that if the slope of
f at equilibrium is zero, that is, the investment function is locally constant, the equilibrium
is always stable. A constant investment function represent an agent whose portfolio choice
is insensitive to price variations. An increase in the sensitivity to price, that is of the slope
of f, would ultimately lead to system instability. Since for r > 0 the slope of the EMC is
decreasing, the larger the value of r, the lower is the minimal strength of agent reaction to
price ﬂuctuations necessary to destabilize the equilibrium.
As an example of application of Proposition 3.3 consider the investment functions drawn
in the left panel of Fig. 1. Assume that the memory span of each agent L is equal to one. In
this case, both equilibrium U1 for agent I and U2 for agent II are unstable, since the second
inequality in (18) is violated. On the contrary, S1 is (presumably) a stable equilibrium, since
the slope of the investment function I in that point is positive and very small. If this slope
would increase, the equilibrium S1 will lose its stability through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
(c.f. upper left panel of Fig. 2). Conversely, the negative value of the equilibrium return r∗ in
S2 implies that an increase of the slope of the investment function II in that point would lead
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Figure 2: Stability regions and bifurcation types of system (11). The boundaries of the stability
region are labeled according to which kind of bifurcation is generated when they are crossed. Upper
Left Panel: Example 1, L = 1. Fixed point is stable if (r∗,f0/l0) belongs to the dark gray area.
Upper Right Panel: Example 2, CWA estimator for diﬀerent values of L. Lower Left Panel:
Example 3, EWMA estimator with λ = 0.6 for diﬀerent values of L. Lower Right Panel: Example
3, EWMA estimator for diﬀerent values of λ and L = ∞.
Example 2. Sample average forecasting rule
Assume that agent invests in the risky asset a fraction of his wealth xt+1 = f(yt) which depends
on his estimate about future price return yt = E[rt+1]. Furthermore, as in e.g. Levy, Levy,
and Solomon (2000) and Chiarella and He (2001), assume that the forecast is obtained as a




(rt + rt−1 + ··· + rt−L+1) . (19)
22The parameter L deﬁnes the length of agent’s memory, that is how many past realizations
are considered to obtain an estimation about future return. The parameter L clearly acts
as a smoothing factor on the agent’s behavior: the larger its value, the more the time steps
needed for a new trend in returns to be reﬂected in agent’s forecast. We will apply the result
of the previous sections to understand how diﬀerent memory lengths aﬀect the behavior of the
market.










By plugging this expression in (17) one can in principle compute the L + 1 multipliers of
the polynomial Q(µ) for the CWA agent. The region of the parameter space where all these
multipliers are inside the unit circle is the stability region of the system. Let’s denote it with
SL, since it clearly depends on the memory length L. As before, this region can be represented
using the (r∗,f0/l0) coordinates system.
We study the eﬀect on the system of diﬀerent memory lengths by analyzing the dependence
of the stability region on the parameter L. When L = 1 we are back to the previous Example.
The stability region S1 is shown as a dark gray area in the upper right panel of Fig. 2.
Irrespectively on the value of L, the boundary associated with a fold bifurcation is given by
the line f0/l0 = 1. Notice that a ﬂip bifurcation is possible only for odd values of L. The
stability region for L = 2 can be obtained analytically and is depicted in the upper right panel
of Fig. 2 as the union of the dark and light gray areas. Since locally horizontal investment
functions always lead to stable equilibria, the points of the horizontal axes lie in the stability
region. This region increases with L and for large enough values of the memory parameter,
any ﬁxed point with f0/l0 < 1 becomes stable.
Summarizing, a large memory span L has a stabilizing eﬀect on the dynamics of the
system. However, if the agent investment function f is too steep, that is if she overreacts
to price ﬂuctuations by a too large readjustment of her portfolio position, then the market
is unstable, irrespectively of the value of L. Referring again to the EMC plot in Fig. 1, for
23investment functions based on CWA estimators, equilibria U1 and U2 are always unstable.
Conversely, both equilibria S1 and S2 will become stable for large enough value of L.
Example 3. EWMA forecasting rule
Assume again that agent investment choice xt+1 = f(yt) depends on estimated future price








with the normalization coeﬃcient CL(λ) = (1 − λ)/(1 − λL). That is, the agent uses an Ex-
ponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) of past returns as predictor of future return.
The decay factor λ ∈ [0,1) quantiﬁes the relative weights of recent observations with respect
to the older ones. The larger the value of λ, the more weight is assigned to distant observa-
tions. When λ is small, the most recent observations have very large relative weights. In the
extreme case λ = 0, only the last available observation is considered.









The stability region of the PCE Sλ,L now depends on both the memory span L and the decay
factor λ. Fixing the value of λ, one can immediately obtain analytical results for the two
limiting cases: L = 1 and L = ∞. In the ﬁrst case, one is back to Example 1. On the other
extreme, when L = ∞, the following applies



















This ﬁxed point exhibits Neimark-Sacker, fold or ﬂip bifurcation if the ﬁrst, second or third
inequality in (23) turns to equality, respectively.
24Proof. The result can be obtained rigorously through reduction of inﬁnite-dimensional system
(11) to the two-dimensional one, using the recursive relation available for the EWMA estimator
in case L = ∞. See Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006). In Appendix E we sketch an
alternative proof.
The conditions in (23) can be used to establish the boundaries of the stability region Sλ,∞.
Three examples for diﬀerent values of λ (S0,∞, S0.2,∞ and S0.6,∞) are depicted on the lower
right panel of Fig. 2. For λ = 0 the stability region S0,∞ is the same as in Example 1, and
is shown as a dark gray area. If λ = 0.2 it expands and becomes the union of the dark and
semi-dark gray areas. When λ = 0.6 the region expands further and contains the light gray
areas in addition. As expected, an increase of the decay factor brings stability to the system.
For the intermediate case, when L is greater than one, but ﬁnite, analytic results are
limited. The case L = 2 is analyzed in Appendix E, and the corresponding bifurcation curves
are shown, for λ = 0.6, in the lower left panel of Fig. 2. The stability region S.6,1 is shown as a
dark gray area. The region S.6,2 is the union of the dark and light gray areas. The boundaries
for L = ∞ are shown as dotted lines.
Diﬀerently from the L = ∞ case, for equilibria with r∗ > 0 investment functions with a
negative slope generate Neimark-Sacker (and not ﬂip) bifurcations. The boundary leading to
the fold bifurcation, on the contrary, remains the same for any L and is given by the line
f0/l0 = 1. Finally, the boundary leading to the ﬂip bifurcation depends on whether L is even
or odd. For even L, the locus is invariant and coincides with the corresponding boundary for
L = ∞. When L is odd, the locus depends on L and converges point-wise to the boundary
of Sλ,∞ when L → ∞. This result implies that the expansion of the stability region is not
monotone in the memory span.
As Proposition 3.4 guarantees, an increase in the memory span L ultimately brings stability
to all ﬁxed points belonging to the interior of Sλ,∞. Since for a given λ this region does not cover
the whole parameter space (r∗,f0/l0), not all ﬁxed points can be stabilized by a sole increase
of L. One can then ask whether unstable ﬁxed points become stable by an appropriate choice
of the decay factor λ. The general answer to this question is no, since the condition f0/l0 < 1
25has to be satisﬁed. However, all ﬁxed points for which this condition holds can be stabilized
through an increase of λ. Indeed, from (23) it follows that the region Sλ,∞ enlarges with λ and
for λ → 1 contains all equilibria with f0(r∗)/l0(r∗) < 1 (c.f. the lower right panel of Fig. 2).
Let us exemplify our ﬁndings, referring again to the EMC plot in Fig. 1. For investment
functions based on EWMA estimators, equilibria U1 and U2 cannot be stabilized neither by
increasing the memory span L, nor by increasing the decay factor λ. Conversely, both equilibria
S1 and S2 will become stable for large enough value of λ and an appropriate L.
4 Economy with Many Agents
This Section extends the previous results to the case of a ﬁnite, but arbitrarily large, number
of heterogenous agents. Each agent n possesses his own investment function fn based on a
ﬁnite number L of past market realizations. We start this section with the derivation of the
2N + L − 1 dimensional stochastic dynamical system which describes the evolution of the
economy. Then we identify all possible equilibria of the associated deterministic skeleton and
analyze their stability.
4.1 Dynamical system
In the many agents case, the evolution of agents’ wealths is no longer decoupled from the
system and, consequently, all equations in (9) are relevant for the dynamics. The ﬁrst-order
dynamical system can be deﬁned in terms of the following 2N + L − 1 independent variables
xt,n ∀n ∈ {1,...,N}; ϕt,n ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}; rt,l ∀l ∈ {0,...,L − 1}, (24)
where rt,l denotes the price return at time t−l. Notice that, since they sum to one, only N −1
wealth shares are needed and at any time step t it is ϕt,N = 1 −
PN−1
n=1 ϕt,n. The dynamics of
the system is provided by the following








































































































yN (1 + exN) − xN
¢
PN−1
n=1 ϕn xn (1 − yn) + (1 −
PN−1









1 + xn (R + e)
1 + (R + e)
³PN−1







´ ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}.
(27)
Proof. We ordered the equations to obtain three separated blocks: X, W and R. The N
equations in block X deﬁne the investment choices of agents. Block W contains N−1 equations
describing the evolution of the wealth shares. The evolution of price returns is accounted for
by the L equations of block R, in ascending order with respect to the time lag.
27The block X is directly obtained from the deﬁnition of the investment functions. The ﬁrst
equation of block R is (7) rewritten in terms of variables (24) using (26) and (5), while the
remaining equations are just the result of a “lag” operation. Notice that (26) reduces to (12)
in the case of one agent. Finally, the evolution of wealth shares described by block W is
obtained from (9) expanding the notation introduced in (5). Due to the presence of function
R in the last expression, all functions Φn depend on the same set of variables as R.
The rest of this Section is devoted to the analysis of the deterministic skeleton of (25).
We replace the yield realizations {et} by their mean value ¯ e and analyze the procedurally
consistent equilibria, the is the ﬁxed points, of the resulting deterministic system.
4.2 Determination of equilibria
The characterization of ﬁxed points of system (25) is in many respects similar to the single




N−1;r∗,...,r∗) denotes a ﬁxed
point where r∗ is the equilibrium return, and x∗
n and ϕ∗
n stand for the equilibrium value of
the investment function and the equilibrium wealth share of agent n, respectively. Let us
introduce the following
Deﬁnition 4.1. Agent n is said to survive in x¤ if his equilibrium wealth share is diﬀerent
from zero, ϕ∗
n 6= 0. Agent n is said to dominate the economy if he is the only survivor,
i.e. ϕ∗
n = 1.
One can recognize the parallel between our deﬁnition above and the frameworks in DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991) and Blume and Easley (1992). We adopt here the
deterministic version of the concepts of survival and dominance used in that papers. The
following statement characterizes all possible equilibria of system (25).
Proposition 4.1. Let x¤ be a PCE of the deterministic skeleton of system (25). Then equi-





∗) ∀n ∈ {1,...,N} , (28)
and three mutually exclusive cases are possible:
28(i) Single survivor. In x¤ only one agent survives and, therefore, dominates the economy.
Without loss of generality we can assume this agent to be agent 1 so that ϕ∗
1 = 1 and all
other equilibrium wealth shares are equal to zero.





and is equal to the equilibrium wealth growth rate of the survivor.
(ii) Non-generic many survivors. In x¤ more than one agent survives. Without loss
of generality one can assume that the agents with non-zero wealth shares are the ﬁrst k
agents (with k > 1) so that the equilibrium wealth shares satisfy
ϕ
∗





n = 1 . (30)




∗) ∀n ∈ {1,...,k} , (31)
implying that the ﬁrst k agents have the same equilibrium investment share x∗
1¦k. The
wealth growth rates of all survivors are equal to r∗.
(iii) Generic many survivors. In x¤ the equilibrium return r∗ = −¯ e. The wealth shares












n = 1 . (32)
The wealth growth rates of all agents are equal to 0.
Proof. See appendix F.
The diﬀerence between items (i) and (ii) is that in the ﬁrst case, when a single agent
survives, Proposition 4.1 deﬁnes a precise value for each component (x∗, ϕ∗ and r∗) of the
equilibrium x¤, so that a single point is uniquely determined. In the second case, on the
contrary, there is a residual degree of freedom in the deﬁnition of the equilibrium: while the
29price return r∗ and the investment share x∗ are uniquely deﬁned, the only requirement on the
equilibrium wealth shares of the surviving agents, ϕ∗
n (for n ≤ k), is the fulﬁllment of the
second equality in (30). Consequently we have
Corollary 4.1. Consider the deterministic skeleton of system (25). If it possesses one equi-
librium x¤ with k survivors as in Proposition 4.1(ii), it possesses a k −1-simplex of equilibria
with k-survivors constituted by all the points obtained from x¤ through a change in the relative





























The diﬀerence among the ﬁrst two cases of Proposition 4.1 does not only regard the geo-
metrical nature of the locus of equilibria. Indeed, while in the ﬁrst case no requirements are
imposed on the behavior of the investment function of the diﬀerent agents, in the second type
of equilibria all the investment shares x∗
1,...,x∗
k must at the same time be equal to a single
value x∗
1¦k. The equilibrium with k > 1 survivors exists only in the particular case in which
the survivors’ investment functions f1,...,fk satisfy this constraint. This constraint is not, in
general, satisﬁed by a set of “generic” functions. Indeed if one considers a population of agents
whose investment functions are “randomly deﬁned”, for instance by picking the values of their
parameters from some continuous distribution, the probability of observing any equilibrium
with multiple survivors is zero. In other terms, the equilibria with many survivors deﬁned in
Proposition 4.1(ii) are non-generic.
Multi-agent equilibria deﬁned in Proposition 4.1(i) and (ii) are both strictly related to
“special” single-agent equilibria. As in the single agent case, the growth rate of the total
wealth is equal to the equilibrium price return, which is, in turn, equal to the growth rate of
survivors’ individual wealth. Moreover, the determination of the equilibrium return level r∗
for the multi-agent case in (29) or (31) is identical to the case where the agent, or one of the
agents, who would survive in the multi-agent equilibrium, is present alone in the market.
Since the relation between equilibrium return level and survivors’ investment shares for
30the many survivors case is equivalent to the single survivor case, one can use the geometrical
interpretation of market equilibria presented in Section 3.2 to illustrate how equilibria with
many agents are determined. As an example let us consider Fig. 1 again. Suppose that two
agents with the investment functions shown in the right panel simultaneously operate in the
market. According to Proposition 4.1(i) all possible equilibria can be found as intersections of
one of the functions with the EMC (cf. (29)). In this case there are four possible equilibria. In
two of them (S1 and U1) agent I survives, so that ϕ∗
1 = 1. In the other two equilibria (S2 and
U2) is agent II who survives and ϕ∗
1 = 0. In each equilibrium, the intersection of the investment
function of the surviving agent with the EMC gives both the equilibrium return r∗ and the
equilibrium investment share of the survivor. The equilibrium investment share of the other
agent can be found, accordingly to (28), as the intersection of his own investment function with
the vertical line passing through the equilibrium return. Since the two investment functions
shown in the left panel of Fig. 1 do not possess common intersections with the EMC, equilibria
with more than one survivor are impossible. An example of a set of investment functions which
allows for multiple survivors equilibria is reported in the left panel of Fig. 3. The common
intersection of diﬀerent investment functions with the EMC deﬁne the manifold of the multiple
survivors equilibria.
Let us now turn to the equilibria identiﬁed in Proposition 4.1(iii). In these equilibria many
agents survive, and their investment and wealth shares are balanced in such a way that the
capital gain and the dividend yield oﬀset each other so that the riskless and the risky assets
have the same expected return. Indeed according to (15) these equilibria are characterized
by a zero equity premium. Since the growth rates of all individual portfolio is the same,
agents position on the market does not impact on their survival at equilibrium, so that in
general one has N survivors. This is however not a requirement, as equilibria of this type
exist even when the wealth shares of a subset of agents go to zero. Diﬀerently from the case
identiﬁed in Proposition 4.1(ii), these are generic equilibria with many survivors. Analogously
to that case, however, any zero equity premium equilibrium has additional degrees of freedom

























































Figure 3: Left panel: Multi-agent equilibria. S2 and U1 are equilibria with two survivors while s1
and U2 are single-survivor equilibria. In S1 agent I dominates the economy, while in U1 agents I and
II both survive. Right panel: No-equity-premium equilibrium with three survivors, with market
position A1, A2 and A3, together with three single survivor equilibria, S1, S2 and S3.
Corollary 4.2. Consider the deterministic skeleton of system (25). If it possesses one equi-
librium x¤ as in Proposition 4.1(iii), it possesses a N −2-manifold of generic many survivors



























Geometrically, in the (r,x) plane, the locus of these equilibria is the vertical asymptote of
the EMC. Assume the market is populated by three agents having (symmetrized) investment
functions as depicted in the right panel of Fig. 3. The ordinates of the points A1, A2 and
A3 represents the agents’ investment share in the risky asset when (rescaled) price return







3 respectively. If there are wealth shares ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 which, together with the above
investment shares, satisfy (32), i.e.
3 X
j=1











1,2 > 0, these equilibria do in fact exists also when all wealth shares are positive.
324.3 Stability of multi-agents equilibria
This Section presents the stability analysis of the equilibria deﬁned in Proposition 4.1. The
three Propositions below provide the stability region in the parameter space for the cases
enumerated in Proposition 4.1, i.e. for the generic case of a single survivor, for the non-
generic case of many survivors and for the generic case with many survivors and without
equity premium. The derivation of these Propositions requires quite cumbersome algebraic
manipulations and we refer the reader to Appendix G for the intermediate lemmas and ﬁnal
proofs.
For the generic case of a single survivor equilibrium we have the following
Proposition 4.2. Let x¤ be a ﬁxed point of (25) associated with a single survivor PCE.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the survivor is the ﬁrst agent. Let Pf1(µ)
denote the (L − 1)-dimensional stability polynomial associated with the investment function
of the survivor. The equilibrium x¤ is (locally) asymptotically stable if the two following
conditions are met:
1) all roots of the polynomial
Q1(µ) = µ
L+1 −
(1 + r∗)µ − 1
r∗ l0(r∗)
Pf1(µ) , (33)
are inside the unit circle.







∗ + ¯ e
¢
< r
∗ , 1 < n ≤ N . (34)
The equilibrium x¤ is unstable if at least one of the roots of the polynomial in (33) is outside
the unit circle or if at least one of the inequalities in (34) holds with the opposite (strict) sign.
In particular, the system exhibits a fold bifurcation if one of the N−1 right-hand inequalities





























Figure 4: Four equilibria in the market with two agents. The gray region is where condition (34) is
satisﬁed.
The stability condition for a single survivor PCE in the multi-agent case is twofold. First,
equilibrium should be “self-consistent”, i.e. it should remain stable even if any non-surviving
agent would be removed from the economy. This intuitive result strictly follows from the
comparison between Q1(µ) in (33) and Q(µ) in (17). This is however not enough. A further
requirement comes from the inequalities in (34). In particular, according to the left-hand
inequality, the wealth growth rate of those agents who do not survive in the stable equilibrium
should be strictly lower than the wealth growth rate of the survivors r∗. Thus, in those
equilibria where r∗ > −¯ e, the surviving agent must be the most aggressive (risk prone) trader
and invest in the risky asset the highest, among all traders, share of wealth. Conversely, in
those equilibria where r∗ < −¯ e, the survivor has to be the least aggressive (most risk averse)
trader.
The EMC plot can be used to geometrically illustrate the previous Proposition. In Fig. 4
we draw again the two investment functions used in the examples of Section 3. Let us now
suppose that they are both present in the market at the same time. The region where the
additional condition (34) is satisﬁed is reported in gray. In Section 4.2 we found four possible
equilibria: S1, S2, U1 and U2. Proposition 4.2 states that, ﬁrst, the dynamics cannot be
34attracted by an equilibrium which was unstable in the respective single-agent case. And,
second, it cannot be attracted by an equilibrium in which non-surviving agents investment
shares at equilibrium belong to the white region. As we have seen in Section 4.2, if an
agent uses EWMA or CWA forecast the points U1 and U2 will be unstable (cf. examples 2
and 3 in Section 3.3). Therefore, they will be unstable also in the multi-agents case. From
item 2) of Proposition 4.2 it follows that S1 is the only stable equilibrium of the two agents
system. Notice, indeed, that in the abscissa of S1, i.e. for the equilibrium return, the linear
investment function of the non-surviving agent II passes below the investment function of the
surviving agent and belongs to the gray area. On the contrary, in the abscissa of S2, the
investment function of the non-surviving agent I is higher and does not belong to the gray
area. Consequently, this equilibrium is unstable. A similar situation occurs in the right panel
of Fig. 3. Among the three single survivor equilibria S1, S2 and S3, only the ﬁrst is stable.
Let us move now to consider the non-generic case, when k diﬀerent agents survive in the
equilibrium. The following applies
Proposition 4.3. Let x¤ be a ﬁxed point of (25) associated with a k survivors PCE, as deﬁned
by (28), (30) and (31).
The ﬁxed point x¤ is never hyperbolic and, consequently, never (locally) asymptotically sta-
ble. Its non-hyperbolic submanifold is the k−1-dimensional manifold deﬁned in Corollary 4.1.
Let Pfn(µ) be the stability polynomial associated with the investment function fn. The
equilibrium x¤ is (locally) stable if the two following conditions are met:
1) all the roots of the polynomial
Q1¦k(µ) = µ
L+1 −






n Pfn(µ) , (35)
are inside the unit circle.





∗ + ¯ e) < r
∗ , k < n ≤ N . (36)
35The equilibrium x¤ is unstable if at least one of the roots of the polynomial in (35) is outside
the unit circle or if at least one of the inequalities in (36) holds with the opposite (strict) sign.
The non-hyperbolic nature of the equilibria with many survivors turns out to be a direct
consequence of their non-unique speciﬁcations. The motion of the system along the k − 1
dimensional subspace consisting of the continuum of equilibria deﬁned in Corollary 4.1 leaves
the aggregate properties of the system invariant so that all these equilibria can be considered
equivalent. Proposition 4.3 also provides the stability conditions for perturbations in the
hyperplane orthogonal to the non-hyperbolic manifold formed by equivalent equilibria. The
polynomial Q1¦k(µ) is quite similar to the corresponding polynomial in Proposition 4.2, except
that one has to weight the stability polynomial of the diﬀerent investment functions Pfk(µ)
with the weights corresponding to the relative wealth of survivors. At the same time, the
constraint on the investment shares (36) is identical to the one obtained in (34). Similarly to
the case with a single survivor, in those equilibria where r∗ > −¯ e all surviving agents must
be more aggressive buyer of risky asset than those who do not survive, and vice versa for
r∗ < −¯ e.
Finally, let us analyze the generic many survivors equilibria with r∗ = −¯ e. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the survivors are the ﬁrst k ≤ N agents. The following result
characterizes the stability of such equilibria
Proposition 4.4. Let x¤ be a ﬁxed point of system (25) belonging to a N − 2-dimensional
manifold of k-survivors equilibria deﬁned by (28) and (32).
If N ≥ 3, the ﬁxed point x¤ is non-hyperbolic and, consequently, is not (locally) asymptot-
ically stable. The equilibrium x¤ is (locally) stable if all the roots of the following polynomial
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Figure 5: Left Panel: Non-linear investment function leading to multiple equilibria. SH and SL are
stable while U is unstable. A second linear investment function always lays below the ﬁrst. Right
Panel: The linear investment function is raised above SL. As a result, market now possesses a new
stable equilibria, SM, while SL looses its stability. In the stable equilibria SH and SM two diﬀerent
agents survive.
The equilibrium x¤ is unstable if at least one of the roots of polynomial in (37) is outside
the unit circle.
As in the case of Proposition 4.3, the “no-equity-premium” equilibria can be non-hyperbolic,
due to the possibility to reallocate wealth between agents without aﬀecting the aggregate prop-
erties of the dynamics. Once the functional form of the investment functions is known, one can
derive the expression of the polynomial Q and obtain the appropriate stability conditions from
the analysis of its roots, analogously to what has been done in the examples of Section 3.3. In
particular, when all the investment functions possess a zero slope in −¯ e, the equilibria (if they
exist) are always stable. Consider the right panel of Fig. 3. Since the investment functions
of agent I and II are ﬂat in A1 and A2 respectively, if the wealth share of agent III is small
enough, then the no-equity-premium equilibrium is stable.
4.4 Optimal selection and multiple stable equilibria
In this Section, using the geometric interpretation based on the EMC, we discuss the implica-
tions of Proposition 4.2 about the asymptotic behavior of the model and its global properties.
37For deﬁniteness, we will mainly conﬁne the discussion to the generic case of equilibria with a
single survivor, but many aspects of it do apply in general.
The ﬁrst implication concerns the aggregate dynamics of the economy. Let us consider
a stable many-agent equilibrium x¤. Let us suppose that r∗ is the equilibrium return in x¤
and that the ﬁrst agent survives. Then his wealth return is equal to r∗ and this is also the
asymptotic growth rate of the total wealth. Then, we can interpret the second requirement
of Proposition 4.2 as saying that, in the dynamic resulting from the competition of diﬀerent
trading strategies, the surviving agent is the one who allows the economy to have the highest
possible rate of growth. Indeed, if any other agent n 6= 1 survived, the economy would have
grown at a rate x∗
n (r∗ + ¯ e), which is lower than r∗ according to (34). This result constitutes
a sort of optimal selection principle since it clearly states the market endogenous selection
toward the best aggregate outcome. Indeed, the market selection mechanism seems to act
in accordance with the asymptotic behavior of the system. In equilibria with r∗ > −¯ e the
aggregate wealth is growing. In this case, and according to the optimal selection principle, the
surviving agent is the most aggressive investor, so as to guarantee the highest possible growth
rate to the whole economy. Conversely, in equilibria with r∗ < −¯ e, when the wealth of the
economy decreases, the survivor is the least aggressive traders, so that the economy shrinks
at the lowest speed.
Notice, however, that this selection criterion does not apply across the whole set of equi-
libria, but only inside the subset formed by equilibria associated with stable ﬁxed points in
the single agent case (c.f. (35)). For instance, with the investment functions shown in Fig. 4,
the dynamics will never end up in U2, even if this is the equilibrium with the highest possible
return. Furthermore, the variety of possible investment functions implies that the optimal
selection principle has a local character. Indeed, due to the “lock-in” eﬀect generated by the
boundedness of attraction domains, it is possible that the market does not select, among all
stable equilibria, the one which provides the highest returns. An illustrative example is pro-
vided by the “step-wise” investment function shown in the left panel of Fig. 5. This function
possesses two stable equilibria, SL and SH. Now suppose that an agent using this function
38competes on the market with a second agent, more risk averse, who always invest smaller
shares of wealth in the risky asset. For instance assume that the second agent uses the con-
stant investment function shown in the same plot. In this situation, the two equilibria of
the nonlinear function remain stable and the riskier agent will ultimately dominate the mar-
ket. However, initial conditions completely determine which one of the two equilibria will be
eventually selected by the market.
Staring from the situation in the left panel of Fig. 5, imagine to shift the constant function
upward, so as to cross the step-wise function between SL and SH. The resulting situation
is represented in the right panel of Fig. 5. This change of strategy by the second agent will
aﬀect the economy in diﬀerent ways, depending on what was the prevailing equilibrium before
the shift. If the system was in SH, no eﬀect is observed and the dominant agent remains the
one with the sigmoid investment function. If instead the economy was in SL, this equilibrium
becomes unstable and the system will tend to move away from it. The ensuing dynamic could
ultimately leads to the dominance of the second agent, so that the system ends up in the
equilibrium SM. This simple example shows that the possibility for a strategy to become
(or remain) dominant does not depend exclusively on the strategy itself, but also, and in
an essential way, on the conditions prevailing in the market when the strategy is actually
implemented and on the global behavior of all other strategies. This result does not only
apply to single survivor equilibria. Indeed another possible source of multiple equilibria is
given by the existence of generic many survivors ﬁxed points identiﬁed in Proposition 4.1(iii).
For example, in the situation depicted in the right panel of Fig. 3, there is a stable equilibrium
where agent I survives alone (point S1) and a manifold of generic equilibria where all three
agents survive. In the latter case, if the wealth share of agent I is large enough, according
to Proposition 4.4, all these equilibria are stable and, depending on the initial condition, the
market can display both single survivor or many survivors equilibria.
395 Conclusion
This paper introduces novel results concerning the characterization and stability of equilibria
in speculative pure exchange economies with heterogeneous CRRA traders. The framework
is relatively general in terms of agents’ behaviors and diﬀers from most of the Heterogeneous
Agents Models in two important respects. First, we analyze the aggregate dynamics and
asymptotic behavior of the market when an arbitrary large number of traders participate to
the trading activity. Second, we do not restrict in any way the procedure used by agents in
order to build their forecast about future prices, nor the way in which agents can use this
forecast to obtain their present asset demand: any smooth investment function mapping the
information set to the present investment choice can be present in the model.
We conﬁne our analysis to those equilibria in which aggregate market dynamics is consistent
with the procedures adopted by agents to form expectations about future price movement. We
derive a complete characterization of Procedurally Consistent Equilibria (PCE) and a descrip-
tion of their stability conditions in terms of few parameters derived from traders investment
strategies. In particular, we show that a simple function, the “Equilibrium Market Curve”,
can be used to obtain a geometric characterization of the location of all possible equilibria.
Furthermore, some results about stability conditions can also be inferred from the same EMC.
We ﬁnd that, irrespectively of the number of agents operating in the market and of the
structure of their demand functions, only three types of PCE are possible:
1. isolated ﬁxed points, where a single agent asymptotically possesses the entire wealth of
the economy,
2. non-generic equilibria, associated with continuous manifolds of ﬁxed points, where many
agents possess a ﬁnite shares of the total wealth,
3. generic equilibria with many survivors, consistent with no-arbitrage pricing.
The notion of PCE allows us to join together the EF and HAMs approaches. Indeed the
stability conditions for the ﬁrst two types of PCE (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.3) incorporates
40two parts. The ﬁrst part shows that the stability of market dynamics depends on agents’
reactions to past prices, as common to HAMs. This result relates to Grandmont (1998)
who puts forward the general theory of individual learning under expectation feedback in
homogeneous environments. The second part highlights the role played by the wealth-driven
selection, and is essentially the requirement of local evolutionary stability common among the
EF models. Notice that this part is not present in the stability conditions of the PCE of the
third type (see Proposition 4.4), where the no-arbitrage condition makes the wealth selection
dynamics irrelevant.
Our general results provide a simple and clear description of the principles governing the
asymptotic market dynamics resulting from the competition of diﬀerent trading strategies.
The optimizing agents may dominate non-optimizing agents but may also be dominated by
them. In general, the ultimate result of competition between agents depends on the whole
market ecology. As we have shown, the EMC is a handy tool to discuss such phenomena
as absence of equilibrium, presence of multiple equilibria, and also for comparative statics
exercises. From the “geometric” analysis made possible by the EMC (c.f. the stability analysis
in Section 4.3) the following two “impossibility theorems” follow in an obvious way. First,
there exists no “best” strategy, independently of what “best” means exactly, since any possible
market equilibrium can be destabilized by some investment function. Second, it is impossible
to build a dominance order relation inside the space of trading strategies, since two strategies
may generate multiple stable equilibria with diﬀerent survivors, so that the outcome will
depend on system initial conditions or on noise.
The main advantage of the present model rests in its ability to provide a relatively sim-
ple framework in which the interplay between agents’ decision processes and market forces
can be studied with reasonable generality. In his famous argument in favor of a rational ap-
proach in economics, Friedman (1953) appeals to the evolutionary ideas of natural selection
to justify optimization. Friedman’s argument states that since market forces tend to weed
out non-rational agents, the modeler can assume that the agents behave as if they are max-
imizers. A number of recent studies has shown that Friedman’s argument is not generally
41valid (e.g. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b), Blume and Easley (1992),
Brock and Hommes (1998)). Our results support this view showing that the survivors in the
market are determined not only by their own strategies but also by the complete behavioral
ecology. Alternatively, one can consider the optimizing agents’ behavior as an outcome of
the learning process. In this case, however, due to possible presence of multiple equilibria or
instability, there is no reason to assume a priori that such learning process will converge to
the corresponding ﬁxed point.
The present analysis can be extended in many directions. First of all, one may raise the
question of the robustness of the results with respect to Assumption 1 about constant dividend
yield. Model in Anufriev and Dindo (2009) investigates the case of growing dividend yield
and shows that some results (as presence of equity premium in equilibria and possibility to
represent the equilibria by the EMC) remain essentially the same. Second, in the limits of
our framework, one can wonder about other possible dynamics. For instance, we have shown
that there is a theoretical possibility of not having any equilibrium at all. The dynamics in
this case remain unknown. We also did not investigate the dynamics after bifurcation, which
is the key question in many heterogeneous agent models. Probably numerical methods can
be eﬀectively applied to study these questions and also clarify the role of initial conditions
and the determinants of the relative size of the basins of attraction for multiple equilibria
scenarios. Third, our general CRRA-framework led us, in Proposition 2.1, to write the system
in terms of returns and wealth shares. There are many behavioral speciﬁcations which were
not analyzed here and are still consistent with our framework. These speciﬁcations range from
the evaluation of the “fundamental” value of the asset, possibly obtained from a private source
of information, to a strategic behavior that tries to keep in consideration the reaction of other
market participants to the revealed individual choices.
APPENDIX
42A Proof of Proposition 2.1
Plugging the expression for wt+1,n from the second equation in system (4) into the right-hand side of the ﬁrst
equation of the same system, and assuming that pt > 0 and, consistently with (6), pt 6=
P
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where we used the ﬁrst equation of (4) rewritten for time t to get the second equality. Condition (6) is obtained
imposing pt+1 > 0, and the dynamics of price return in (7) are immediately derived. From the second equation
of (4) it follows that
wt+1,n = wt,n
¡
1 + xt,n (rt+1 + et+1)
¢
∀n ∈ {1,...,N} , (38)























1 + xt,n (rt+1 + et+1)
¢
,
where (38) has been used to get the second line and we divided both numerator and denominator by the total
wealth at time t to get the third.
B Example of agents behavior
Suppressing any agent-speciﬁc index, we start with the evolution of the agent’s (rescaled) wealth given by (4)
wt+1 = wt + xtwt (rt+1 + et+1).
The future wealth depends on the total return zt+1 = rt+1 + et+1 at time t, which is unknown . The decision
to invest a fraction of wealth xt yields the portfolio return
ρt+1 = wt+1/wt − 1 = xt (rt+1 + et+1).
43Assume that agent’s utility depends on his portfolio return and has a mean-variance expression with a










requires that an agent forms expectations Et−1[zt+1] and Vt−1[zt+1] about the ﬁrst two moments of future total
return on the basis of the information set It−1 available at the beginning of period t. Solving the optimization















parameterized by the risk aversion coeﬃcient β. These functions depends on two statistics of the future
returns distribution, θ1 = g1(zt+1) = Et−1[zt+1] and θ2 = g2(zt+1) = Vt−1[zt+1]. The behavior of the agent is
ultimately determined by the expectation functions g1 and g2 used to obtain these statistics.
One possible direction, inspired by the HAMs literature, is to distinguish diﬀerent types of traders based
on stylized behavior. For example, suppose that “fundamentalists” do not take past observations into account,
but expect an exogenous risk premium (i.e., excess return) gF




e is the variance of the yield process. As a result of substitution of these expectation functions in the choice







which is constant. Conversely, suppose that “chartists” try to learn the level of return from the past observa-
tions, so that gC
1 (It−1) = a + bzt−1, while they still have constant estimation for the variance, gC
2 ≡ σ2
e. As a
result, we obtain for the chartists the investment function
hC
β =




which is a linear function of the previous total return. Within our framework one can study the dynamics of
a market populated by these two types of traders and address such questions as the role of risk-aversion β,
risk premium δ, or extrapolation coeﬃcient b for the equilibrium and stability of the system. The reader is
referred to Anufriev (2008) for a study of these questions in the case of arbitrary linear investment functions.
The choice function (40) with special linear predictors was previously considered in Chiarella and He (2001).
The discussion above represents but a simple example of an agent investment function. Many generalization
are possible and have been explored in the past. Instead of a mean-variance utility the agent could maximize
the expected utility (EU) of future wealth. Several functional speciﬁcations are suggested in the literature, most
44notably the power utility function for which, however, closed form solutions are in general not available. Or
one can replace the expectation operator with more sophisticated alternative, like the maximin criterion or the
minimax-regret criterion discussed in Brock and Manski (2008). Both these criteria will give choice functions
which depend on a small set of statistics which are in turn speciﬁed through the deﬁnition of appropriate
expectation functions. Concerning the latter, one can adopt a classical Bayesian approach or, more common
in the HAMs literature, use adaptive learning estimators derived from statistical analysis, like moving windows
estimators of central tendency. Diﬀerent learning rules of diﬀerent degree of sophistication have been suggested
in the literature. See Colucci and Valori (2006) for an overview. Since all of them can be represented as a
function of past data, they all satisfy to the requirements of our framework. A typical question in the adaptive
learning literature is whether multiple equilibria are possible and whether they can be approached through
the learning mechanism. One can easily study these questions within our framework, see Section 3.4. What is
more, one can do it in the presence of heterogeneous agents’ behavior.
C Proof of Proposition 3.1
Plugging the equilibrium values of the variables in the ﬁrst equation of (11), one gets x∗ = f(r∗,...,r∗).
Now using R(x∗,x∗,e) = ex∗/(1 − x∗) one can invert the second equation to get (14). Item (ii) follows
directly from condition (6) written at equilibrium. Finally, from (8) using the previous relations one has
ρ∗ = x∗(r∗ + ¯ e) = l(r∗)(r∗ + ¯ e) = r∗.
D Proof of Proposition 3.2
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xk µn−k , (41)
Proof. Consider this determinant as a sum of elements from the ﬁrst row multiplied on the corresponding
minor. The minor of element xk, whose corresponding sign is (−1)k+1, is a block-diagonal matrix consisting of
45two blocks. The upper-left block is an upper-diagonal matrix with 1’s on the diagonal. The lower-right block
is a lower-diagonal matrix with −µ’s on the diagonal. The determinant of this minor is equal to (−µ)n−k and
the relation above immediately follows.
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Let I be the (L + 1) × (L + 1) identity matrix. Expanding the determinant of J − µI by the elements of
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Remembering that l0(r∗) = x∗(1 − x∗)/r∗ it is immediate to see that (44) is proportional to (17).
E Analysis of single agent examples
In what follows we will make use of few basic results of bifurcation analysis in low dimensional discrete
dynamical systems. We brieﬂy summarize them here to help the unacquainted reader. For the extensive
theory of the stability and bifurcation analysis of the autonomous dynamical systems see e.g. Guckenheimer
and Holmes (1983), Medio and Lines (2001) and Kuznetsov (2004).
46A ﬁxed point of a discrete dynamical system is asymptotically stable if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix computed in the ﬁxed point are inside the complex unit circle. For two-dimensional dynamical systems
this amount to
Proposition E.1 (Suﬃcient conditions for the local stability). The ﬁxed point of a two-dimensional discrete
dynamical system is locally asymptotically stable if the following conditions are satisﬁed
d < 1 , t < 1 + d , t > −1 − d . (45)
where t and d are, respectively, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix computed in the ﬁxed
point.
The ﬁxed point is unstable if at least one of the eigenvalues lies outside the unit circle. The situation
in which the change of one or more parameters of the system leads to the cross of the unit circle by one (or
two complex conjugated) eigenvalues is called a bifurcation. Three types of generic bifurcations are usually
considered, depending on where the unit circle is crossed. A bifurcation is called fold, ﬂip or Neimark-Sacker,
if an eigenvalues crosses the unit circle in 1, −1 or outside the real axis, respectively.For two-dimensional
dynamical system this amount to
Proposition E.2. The ﬁxed point of a two-dimensional discrete dynamical system looses its stability when one
of the inequalities in conditions (45) is changing its sign. The system exhibits a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation if
d = 1, a fold bifurcation if t = 1 + d, and a ﬂip bifurcation if t = −1 − d.
E.1 Stability for the system with short memory forecast
In this case the second degree polynomial associated with the constant stability polynomial reads








and Proposition 3.3 follows straight-forwardly from the application of the two Propositions above.
E.2 Stability for the system with Constant Weighted forecast
















where, as before, variables X = r∗ and Y = f0(r∗)/l0(r∗) correspond to the abscissa and ordinate of the
stability region diagrams in Fig. 2.
47Bifurcations Loci
Unfortunately, for polynomials of degree higher than 2, conditions analogous to (45) are unavailable. One can,
however, characterize the loci of diﬀerent types of bifurcations. By locus of, say, the ﬂip bifurcation we mean
the set of those pairs (X,Y ) under which one of the roots of (49) is equal to −1. Notice that, in general, not
any point on these loci corresponds to the associated bifurcation, since a bifurcation happens only if all other
roots are inside the unit circle. With this remark in mind, we formulate
Lemma E.1. Consider polynomial (46) for arbitrary L. The locus of fold bifurcations is deﬁned by Y = 1.





Proof. The computations are pretty straight-forward: one has to let µ = 1 and µ = −1 in (46).
The locus of Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is found by plugging µ = eiψ, where ψ is arbitrary angle and i
is the imaginary unit, into equation Q(µ) = 0. For high L the corresponding curve may have high dimension,
so we conﬁne ourselves to the case L = 2.
Lemma E.2. Consider polynomial (46) for L = 2. The locus of Neimark-Sacker bifurcations is given by
Y 2 (2 + X) − 2X2Y − 4X2 = 0 , (47)
subject to constraint 16X2 − (2 + X)2Y 2 > 0.
Proof. One has to solve the equation
2Xe3iψ − (1 + X)Y e2iψ + XY eiψ + Y = 0 . (48)
Using Euler formula and setting the real and imaginary parts of the right-hand side to zero, one gets a system




2 ψ) − 2(1 + X)Y cosψ + Y − (1 + X)Y
´
= 0 .
Since we are interested in pure complex roots of the characteristic polynomial we assume that sin ψ 6= 0. Thus,
the expression in the big parenthesis is equal to 0. Then, we substitute the resulting expression for 3−4sin
2 ψ
in the equation of the real parts of (48) and, using relation cos3ψ = cosψ(1 − 4sin
2 ψ), obtain
cosψ =
Y (1 + X) + Y
4X
.








16X2 − (2 + X)2 Y 2
³
− 2Y 2 + 2(2 + Y )X2 − X Y 2
´
= 0.
48In any solution of this system, the common expression in the parenthesis must be equal to zero, which gives
(47). Additional constraint guarantees that the squared root in the second equation is real.
In the upper right panel of Fig. 2 the curve (47) is reported together with the loci derived in Lemma E.1.
Limiting case, L → ∞
The behavior of the locus of ﬂip bifurcations when the memory parameter increases may suggest that any
point of the system for which f0/l0 < 1 can be stabilized for large enough value of L. Indeed, let us consider
the region outside of the unit circle (including the circle itself), ﬁx µ = µ0 and let L → ∞. Since |µ0| ≥ 1, it
is 1/µL











which does not admit zeros outside the unit circle irrespectively of the value of X and Y .
E.3 Stability for the system with EWMA forecast












(1 + X)µ − 1
´!
, (49)
where X = r∗ and Y = f0(r∗)/l0(r∗). We proceed through the same steps as in the previous case.
Bifurcations Loci
First we characterize the loci of fold and ﬂip bifurcations.
Lemma E.3. Consider polynomial (49) for arbitrary λ and L. The locus of fold bifurcations is given by












= 0 for L even.
Proof. The direct substitution of µ = 1 and µ = −1 to (49) leads to the conclusion.
For the locus of Neimark-Sacker bifurcations we consider the case L = 2 and prove the following
Lemma E.4. Consider polynomial (49) for L = 2 and arbitrary λ. The locus of Neimark-Sacker bifurcations
is given by the following curve of the second order
Y 2 λ
¡
X + 1 + λ
¢
+ Y X (1 + λ)
¡
1 − λ − λX
¢
− X2 (1 + λ)2 = 0 , (50)
subject to constraint 4(1 + λ2)X2 − (1 + λ + X)2Y 2 > 0.
49Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma E.2.
The curve (50) is depicted in the lower left panel of Fig. 2 together with the loci derived in Lemma E.3.
The construction of the stability region is completed applying the property of continuity of the roots of a
polynomial on its coeﬃcients.
Limiting case, L → ∞
Finally, we sketch here a heuristic proof of Proposition 3.4 Consider a value µ0 outside the unit circle, |µ0| ≥ 1.







0 − λµ0 − (1 − λ)
Y
X
((1 + X)µ0 − 1) = 0
¶
.
Since |µ0| > λ for any value of λ, the fraction is ﬁnite and bounded away from zero. By applying the conditions
in Proposition E.1 to the last equation one sees that if (23) are satisﬁed, its roots are inside the unit circle.
F Proof of Proposition 4.1
¿From block X one immediately has (28). From the ﬁrst row of block R it is



























N (1 − x∗
N)
. (51)
Let us, ﬁrst, assume that r∗ + ¯ e 6= 0. Then, from block W using (27) one obtains
ϕ∗















n ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}. (52)
Together with (51) this equation admits two types of solutions, depending on whether one or many equilibrium
wealth shares are diﬀerent from zero.
If only one wealth share is zero, one can assume ϕ∗
1 = 1. In this case (52) is satisﬁed for all agents. From
(51) one has x∗
1 = r∗/(¯ e + r∗) which together with (28) leads to (29).
If, instead, many agents survive one can assume (30). In this case, the second equality of (52) must be
satisﬁed for any n ≤ k. Since its left-hand side does not depend on n, a x∗
1¦k must exist such that x∗




n = 0 for n > k and x∗
n = x∗
1¦k for n ≤ k in (51) one gets x∗
1¦k = r∗/(¯ e + r∗). The
equilibrium return r∗ is implicitly deﬁned combining this last relation with (28) for n ≤ k.
Consider ﬁnally the case when r∗ +¯ e = 0. Then all equations in block W are satisﬁed, while (51) straight-
forwardly leads to (32).
The equilibrium wealth growth rates of the survivors are immediately obtained from (8) and (28).
50G Proofs of Propositions of Section 4.3
Before proving Propositions 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 we need some preliminary results. The Jacobian matrix of the
deterministic skeleton of system (25) is a
¡




2N + L − 1
¢
matrix. Using the block structure





































The block ∂X/∂X is a N×N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ present investment choices
with respect to the agents’ past investment choices. According to (10) the investment choice of any agent does









= 0 , 1 ≤ n,m ≤ N ,
and this block is a zero matrix.
The block ∂X/∂W is a N × (N − 1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ investment









= 0 , 1 ≤ n ≤ N , 1 ≤ m ≤ N − 1 .
The block ∂X/∂R is a N × L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ investment choices










n , 1 ≤ n ≤ N , 1 ≤ l ≤ L .
The deﬁnitions of the other blocks will make use of the functions R and Φn which have been deﬁned in
(26) and (27), respectively. Function R depends on agents’ contemporaneous investment choices given by the
investment functions fm, on agents’ previous investment choices xt,m and on agents’ wealth shares ϕt,m. Let
denote the corresponding derivatives as Rfm, Rxm and Rϕm. The function Φn depends on agents’ previous
investment choices xt,m, on agents’ wealth shares ϕt,m and on the value of return given by function R. The




The block ∂W/∂X is a (N − 1) × N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth shares











n · Rxm , 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 , 1 ≤ m ≤ N . (54)
The block ∂W/∂W is a (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth











n · Rϕm , 1 ≤ n,m ≤ N − 1 . (55)
51The block ∂W/∂R is a (N − 1) × L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth share














m , 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 , 1 ≤ l ≤ L . (56)
The block ∂R/∂X is the L×N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with respect











Rxn l = 1
0 otherwise
, 1 ≤ l ≤ L , 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
The block ∂R/∂W is the L × (N − 1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with










Rϕn l = 1
0 otherwise
, 1 ≤ l ≤ L , 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 .


















Rr0 Rr1 ... RrL−2 RrL−1
1 0 ... 0 0























With the previous deﬁnitions and diﬀerentiating the correspondent functions, one obtains
Lemma G.1. Let x¤ be an equilibrium of system (25). The corresponding Jacobian matrix, J(x¤), has the
following structure, where the actual values of non-zero elements vary depending on whether there exists an































































. . . [ Φ
ϕ
1,k ] [ Φ
ϕ
k+1,N ] [ Φr ]
. . .
? ... ? 0 ... 0 ? ... ? ? ... ? ? ... ? ¥

















0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... F 0 ... 0 0
Rx1 ... Rxk 0 ... 0 Rϕ1 ... Rϕk Rϕk+1 ... RϕN−1 Rr0 ... RrL−2 RrL−1



















































[Φr]. In particular, all the elements of the latter block are zeros in the equilibrium with equity premium.
Furthermore, in such equilibrium the elements labeled as ¥’s are also 0’s. Finally, the elements labeled as F’s
on the diagonal of the central block are all equal to 1 in the no-equity-premium equilibria.
Proof. For the computation of the elements in the second big row-block, it will be useful to establish the values





m)(r∗ + ¯ e)
1 + (r∗ + ¯ e)
­
x∗® , Rxm = ϕ∗
m
x∗











1 + (r∗ + ¯ e)
­
x∗® , Rfm = ϕ∗
m
1 + x∗









n(r∗ + ¯ e)
¢
− ϕ∗
n(r∗ + ¯ e)(x∗
m − x∗
N)














Consider the equilibrium with r∗ 6= −¯ e, i.e. the one described in Proposition 4.1(i) and (ii). Since in such an
equilibrium all survivors invest the same wealth share in the risky asset, one has ΦR


































n(r∗ + ¯ e)
¢
− ϕ∗










= 0 , ∀n,m .
(57)
On the other hand, in an equilibrium with r∗ = −¯ e, i.e. the one described in Proposition 4.1(iii), it is Φxm
n = 0,
Φϕm
n = δn,m and ΦR
n = ϕ∗
nx∗


























































Lemma G.2. Consider equilibrium x¤ with r∗ 6= −¯ e. The characteristic polynomial PJ of the matrix J(x¤)
reads





j (r∗ + ¯ e)














where Pfn is the stability polynomial associated to the n-th investment function as deﬁned in (16).
Proof. The following proof is constructive: we will identify in succession the factors appearing in (59). At each
step, a set of eigenvalues is found and the problem is reduced to the analysis of the residual matrix obtained
removing the rows and columns associated with the relative eigenspace.
Consider the Jacobian matrix in Lemma G.1. The last N −k columns of the left blocks contain only zero
entries so that the matrix possesses eigenvalue 0 with (at least) multiplicity N − k. Moreover, in each of the
last N −1−k rows in the central blocks the only non-zero entries belong to the main diagonal. Consequently,
Φ
ϕj
j for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 are eigenvalues of the matrix, with multiplicity (at least) one. A ﬁrst contribution











j(r∗ + ¯ e)
1 + r∗ − µ
¶
(60)
where we used (57) to compute Φ
ϕj
j at equilibrium.
In order to ﬁnd the remaining part of the characteristic polynomial we eliminate the rows and columns













































































k 0 ... 0 0
Rx1 ... Rxk Rϕ1 ... Rϕk Rr0 ... RrL−2 RrL−1





































This quadratic matrix has 2k + L rows when k < N. If k = N, representation (61) is, strictly speaking, not
correct. Indeed, there exist only N − 1 wealth shares ϕ’s in the original system, therefore the central block of
the matrix has maximal dimension (N −1)×(N −1). Therefore, in this case, the correct matrix has dimension
(2N + L − 1) × (2N + L − 1) and can be obtained from (61) through the removal of the last row and the
last column in the central blocks. In computing the characteristic polynomial we consider separately the case
when k < N and when k = N.







n v if n = m
−ϕ∗
n v otherwise





¢ ¯ e + r∗
1 + r∗ . (62)
Moreover, since all survivors invest the same share x1¦k, it follows that for m ≤ k




1¦k (1 − x∗
1¦k)
. (63)
The central column block of the determinant can be represented as
° ° v b + b1 | ... | v b + bk
° °, where the
55following column vectors have been introduced
b =
°










° 0 ... 0
¯
¯ 1 − µ ... 0
¯








° 0 ... 0
¯
¯ 0 ... 1 − µ
¯




We consider each of the columns in the central block as a sum of two terms and, applying the multilinear
property of the determinant, end up with a sum of 2k determinants. Many of them are zeros, since they contain
two or more columns proportional to vector b. There are only k + 1 non-zero elements in the expansion. One
of them has the following structure of the central column block:
°
° b1 | ... ... ... | bk
°
°, while k others
possess similar structure in the central column block, with column v b on the ν’th place instead of bν, i.e. for
all ν ∈ {1,...,k} the blocks look like
° ° b1 | ... | v b | ... | bk
° °.
The central matrix in the one obtained from the former block is diagonal and, therefore, its determinant







































Rx1 ... Rxk Rr0 − µ ... RrL−2 RrL−1


























The other k determinants can be simpliﬁed in analogous way, so that



















































ν 0 ... 0 0
Rx1 ... Rxk v b Rr0 − µ ... RrL−2 RrL−1































We expand the last matrix on the minors of the elements of the central column. For this purpose we introduce

















































ν 0 0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 1 −µ ... 0 0


































ν detM(k) − bdetNν(k)
¢
. (67)
The determinant of M(k) can be computed in a recursive way. Consider the expansion by the minors of the
elements in the ﬁrst column. The minor of the ﬁrst element −µ is a matrix with a structure similar to M(k).
Denote it as M(k − 1). The minor associated with Rx1 has a left upper block with k − 1 entries equal to −µ
below the main diagonal. This block generates a contribution µk−1 to the determinant and once its columns
and rows are eliminated, one remains with a matrix of type (41). Applying Lemma D.1 one then has
detM(k) = (−µ) detM(k − 1) + (−1)kRx1µk−1 (−1)L−1 Pf1(µ) ,
where Pf1 is the stability polynomial associated with the ﬁrst investment function. Applying recursively the
relation above, the dimension of the determinant is progressively reduced. At the end the lower right block of
57the original matrix remains, which is again a matrix similar to (41). Applying once more Lemma D.1 one has
the following
detM(k) = (−1)L−1+k µk−1
k X
j=1








The determinant of Nν(k) can be computed using a similar strategy. The only diﬀerence is that in the last
recursive step one of the matrix has zero determinant. Therefore, we have:
detNν(k) = (−µ) detNν(k − 1) + (−1)kΦx1






















ν Pfj(µ) = −v detM(k) .
(The last equality above follows directly from expression for Φ
xj
ν .) Substituting the last relation into (65) and
using the expression for detM(k) in (68) the last contribution to the characteristic polynomial reads
det(L − µI) = (1 − µ)k−1 (1 − µ − v) detM(k) =
= (−1)L−1+k µk−1 (1 − µ)k−1
µ
1 + x∗
N(r∗ + ¯ e)
1 + r∗ − µ
¶
0







j Pfj(µ) − µL+1
1
A ,
where the derivatives of R are computed in accordance with the results of Lemma G.1.
If k = N, i.e. all agents survive, then all investment shares are the same. In this case, from (57), all
elements in the central column block of matrix (61) are zeros apart from the 1’s on the diagonal in the central
matrix. This contributes to the characteristic polynomial a factor (1 −µ)N−1. In this case the remaining part
is the determinant of M and the derived expression is consistent with the equation above.
The product of the last expression and (60) gives (59), which completes the proof.
Lemma G.3. Consider no-equity-premium equilibrium x¤ with r∗ = −¯ e. The characteristic polynomial PJ
of the matrix J(x¤) reads
PJ(µ) = (−1)L+N (1 − µ)N−2 µN−1 ¡













Proof. Since the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma G.2. some details are omitted. In particular, we
conﬁne the analysis to the case k < N. From the Jacobian matrix in Lemma G.1 it follows that the only
non-zero entries in the N − 1 − k last rows belonging to the central row block belong to the main diagonal
of [∂W/∂W] and are equal to 1. In addition, the last N − k columns of the leftmost blocks contain only zero
entries. Thus the ﬁrst factor in the characteristic polynomial reads
(−µ)N−k (1 − µ)N−1−k , (70)



















































1 Rx1 ... ΦR
1 Rxk 1 + ΦR



















k Rx1 ... ΦR
k Rxk ΦR








Rx1 ... Rxk Rϕ1 ... Rϕk Rr0 ... RrL−2 RrL−1





































To compute det(L − I) where L stands for the identity matrix, we apply the multilinear property of the
determinant to the central block of columns. In order to implement this idea, we introduce the following
column vectors of length 2k + L:
d =
° °









° ° 0 ... 0
¯
¯ 1 − µ ... 0
¯






° ° 0 ... 0
¯ ¯ 0 ... 1 − µ
¯ ¯ 0 0 ... 0
°
° ° .
The central column block can be represented as
°
° Rϕ1 d + d1 | ... | Rϕk d + dk
°
°. To compute det(L − I)
we consider each of the columns in the central block as a sum of two terms and end up with a sum of
2k determinants. Notice, however, that many of them are zeros, since they contain two or more columns
proportional to vector d. There are only k + 1 non-zero elements in the expansion. The determinant of the
matrix with the structure
° ° d1 | ... ... ... | dk
° ° in the central part is equal to (1 − µ)k detN(k), where
N(k) is identical to the matrix M(k) deﬁned in (64). (We slightly changed notation in order to stress that
the partial derivatives Rxj and Rfj used in these two matrices have diﬀerent values in diﬀerent equilibria.)
Using (68) together with (58) it is immediate to see that
detN(k) = (−1)L+k µk−1
0
@µL+1 +









The other non-zero elements possess a similar structure in the central column block, with column Rϕν d
on the ν’th place instead of dν for all ν ∈ {1,...,k}. Their determinants can be represented as (1 −





















































Rx1 ... Rxk Rϕν Rr0 − µ ... RrL−2 RrL−1































This matrix can be simpliﬁed, since its central row is (almost) proportional to the next row (the ﬁrst row in
the bottom block). Applying the multilinear property of the determinant, and computing the determinant of
the resulting matrix we get
detNν(k) = (−µ)L+kRϕνΦR
v .
Using the corresponding expressions from Lemma G.1, one can check that
Pk
ν=1 ΦR
ν Rϕν = −¯ e. Therefore,




= (1 − µ)k detN(k) − (1 − µ)k−1(−µ)L+k¯ e =
= (1 − µ)k−1(−1)L+k µk−1
0
@(1 − µ)µL+1 + (1 − µ)






j Pfj(µ) − µL+1¯ e
1
A =












Combining now the last expression with (70) we get polynomial (69).
Using the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix in the corresponding equilibrium, it is straight-
forward to derive the equilibrium stability conditions of Section 4.3.
The case of one survivor: Proof of Proposition 4.2
If k = 1 the characteristic polynomial (59) reduces to





j (r∗ + ¯ e)
1 + r∗ − µ
¶ µ
µL+1 −







60¿From the expression of the derivative of the EMC at equilibrium l0(r∗) one can see that the last factor









¯ < 1 j ≥ 2 ,
and the Proposition is proved.
The case of many survivors: Proof of Proposition 4.3
In the case of k > 1 survivors the characteristic polynomial in (59) possesses a unit root with multiplicity
k − 1. Consequently, the ﬁxed point is non-hyperbolic.
To ﬁnd the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue 1 we subtract from the initial Jacobian matrix (53)
computed at equilibrium the identity matrix of the corresponding dimension and analyze the kernel of the
resulting J − I matrix. This can be done through the analysis of the kernel of the matrix obtained by the
substitution of the identity matrix from matrix L given in (61). Let us consider the k < N and the k = N
cases separately.
When k < N, as we showed in the proof of Lemma G.2, in the matrix obtained as a result of subtraction
of an identity matrix from (61), the central k − 1 columns are identical, see (62) and (63). Therefore, the



















, 1 ≤ n ≤ k − 1 . (73)
Notice that the direction of vector un corresponds to a change in the relative wealths of the n-th and k-th
survivor.
If, instead, k = N, then the last k − 1 columns in the resulting (from (61)) matrix are zero vectors, and
















, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 . (74)
whose direction corresponds to a change in the relative wealths of the n-th and N-th survivors.
If the system is perturbed away from equilibrium x¤ along the directions deﬁned in (73) or (74), a new ﬁxed
point is reached. Then, the system is stable, but not asymptotically stable, with respect to these perturbations.
Moreover, since the eigenspaces identiﬁed above do not depend on the system parameters, it is immediate
to realize that they do constitute not only the tangent spaces to the corresponding non-hyperbolic manifolds,
but the manifolds themselves.









¯ < 1 j > k + 1 ,
which completes the proof.
61The case of “no-equity-premium” equilibria. Proof of Proposition 4.4
Independently of the number of survivors, the characteristic polynomial in (69) possesses a unit root with
multiplicity N −2. Consequently, the ﬁxed point x¤ is never hyperbolic, when N ≥ 3. It is easy to see that in
this case all equilibria belong to the manifold of dimension N − 2 and that this is exactly the non-hyperbolic
manifold of x¤. For the stability of equilibrium x¤ with respect to the perturbations in the directions orthogonal
to this manifold, it is suﬃcient to have all other eigenvalues inside the unit circle. If this condition is satisﬁed,
then the equilibrium x¤ is stable, but not asymptotically stable. Since ¯ e > 0, this suﬃcient condition can be
expressed through the roots of the last term in (69), which is exactly the polynomial (37).
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